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Both Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche maintained an abiding concern 
for Socrates throughout their productive lives. Kierkegaard wrote his dissertation 
on irony through a Socratic lens and Nietzsche once declared that try as he 
might, he could not completely separate his concerns from those he associated 
with the Greek. Kierkegaard famously favored Aristophanes’ portrait of Socrates 
in his comedy Clouds, claiming that it accurately portrayed the illegibility of the 
ironist. Nietzsche leaned toward Xenophon’s Socratic writings but most famously 
blamed Plato’s Socrates for the demise of tragic culture. Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche engaged with the variety of Socratic depictions throughout their 
careers and perhaps more importantly, both employed irony in a Socratic fashion 
inflected by textual concerns. In other words, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
understood irony as both the indication of an epistemological limit, and as a 
strategy to induce the reader to think herself into the text. My article “Clouds: The 
Tyranny of Irony over Philosophy” analyzes this common concern and its 
implications for our understanding of European modernity.  
 
Michael Stern is an Associate Professor in the Department of German and 
Scandinavian at the University of Oregon. He is the author of Nietzsche’s Ocean, 
Strindberg’s Open Sea and various articles on literature, film, and philosophy. He 
is currently finishing up a monograph entitled The Singing Socrates, and has 
begun a project called Conversations with African Philosophers.  
 
Introduction: The Mask of Dionysus 
In 423 B.C.E. the first production of Aristophanes’ Clouds won third place at the 
Dionysia. As was his custom, Aristophanes took aim at his contemporaries in 
Athens, and his depiction of Socrates could easily be considered unflattering; he 
depicted the philosopher as an incomprehensible and trivial windbag lacking a 
modicum of either ethical comportment or common sense. At the performance, 
Socrates, who was still alive, is reputed to have stood up showing himself to the 
crowd as if to say, yes that is me on stage, the illegible one. Søren Kierkegaard, 
who in many ways played the role of Copenhagen’s own irascible gadfly, 
harbored a deep affection for both Socrates and Aristophanes’ portrait of the man. 
He felt that an ironist such as Socrates could not be possibly understood by age 
towards which he turns, faces, and questions.1  
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 Another admirer of Socrates, Friedrich Nietzsche preferred Xenophon’s 
portrait of Socrates above all others. While many commentators including 
Kierkegaard criticize Xenophon for having shortchanged the philosophical 
implications of Socrates’ life and thought, and some would claim that there is an 
absence of irony in these depictions, one only has to recall one moment in the 
Memorabilia to understand the great ironist Nietzsche’s attraction to the text. At 
the end of The Banquet, Xenophon’s version of a Symposium attended by 
Socrates, the philosopher and several of the other guests observe a performance. 
A young man and woman are playing the parts of Dionysus and Ariadne on 
Naxos. Something curious happens: “when Dionysus arose and gave his hand to 
Ariadne to rise also, there was presented the impersonation of lovers kissing and 
caressing each other” (Xenophon, Banquet: 635). There is nothing strange in 
that; actors acting the part though an impersonation are hardly breaking 
convention. However, Xenophon records the spectator’s reactions thus: 
The onlookers viewed a Dionysus truly handsome, an Ariadne truly 
fair, not presenting a burlesque but offering genuine kisses with 
their lips; and all were raised to a high pitch of enthusiasm as they 
looked on. For they all overheard Dionysus asking her if she loved 
him, and heard her vowing that she did, so earnestly that not only 
Dionysus but all the bystanders as well would have taken their 
oaths in confirmation that the youth and the maid surely felt a 
mutual affection. For theirs was the appearance not of actors who 
had been taught their poses but of persons now permitted to satisfy 
their long cherished desires. (Banquet 635) 
 According to Xenophon’s description, the performers inhabited their roles 
in a manner that they merged with the someone else they portrayed. The 
onlookers, Socrates included, viewed a performance that convinced even the 
performers, who were able to inhabit their roles and make the desires of those 
portrayed their own. Socrates and his friends understood the mask of Dionysus 
to be his true face and the performance took an ironic turn where the audience 
could not discern enactment from existence, and perhaps as I have already 
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suggested neither could the actors. It was as if Xenophon understood avant la 
letter the Nietzschean premise that everything profound wears a mask, which 
grows around every profound thinker or thought due to false interpretation.2 
 The salient point is that this performance blurs the line between role-
playing and existence and opens up the possibilities of understanding someone 
else’s affect and of extending this understanding through a mimetic reaction. 
There is an irony to this aesthetic performance and its reception; the actors and 
the audience tacitly agree to allow the actor to become the mask and the mask in 
turn informs both the actors and spectators sense of their own desires, and their 
comportment towards them. Xenophon’s depiction of this scene and how it 
affected the banqueters reminds us of this phenomenon. He writes:  “those who 
were unwedded swore they would take themselves wives, and those who were 
already married mounted horse and rode off to their wives that they might enjoy 
them” (Banquet: 635). 
 Though there is no Nietzschean commentary about this scene, either 
published or in the notebooks, one could imagine that this was a moment where 
his affection for Xenophon’s Socrates peaked. For it is here that a performative 
irony blurs the lines between the mask and the God, a moment where the highest 
thought can be confused with the human being who portrays it, forgetting himself 
all the while; his subjectivity an affect of this oscillation between the self and the 
role being played. Subjectivity from this perspective has an ironic component; we 
play roles that are other to us, and we are observed as merging with those roles, 
yet that merger allows for others to experience our affect in a human sense, as 
something possible for ourselves in our particularity. Irony tells us there is only so 
much we can know about the other, but his illegibility alerts us to his commonality 
to us.  
 These two examples exemplify one of lessons that Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche have to convey; irony brings epistemological limits into a process of 
representation, highlighting the multiplicity of interpretative possibility as it 
challenges stable and conventional meaning. They teach that irony is the trope of 
becoming in that it never allows the idea to rest; it does not allow thought to find 
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repose, to nestle safely in the truth of being. Irony separates by virtue of being 
discrepant by nature; it can be deployed to bring us to an interpretative act that 
creates a crack in the boundary between self and other, and as such provides us 
with an approach to understanding the possibility of an ethics. Irony can be used 
to empty out the fictive fullness of bourgeois subjectivity, with its collective notion 
of individuality, and in doing so, leaves a trace, enabling us to engage with 
difference, and most importantly, irony leaves the room for the other to engage 
with us. Irony’s pathos emerges in the collision of expectations and 
interpretations, and as such, it is also the means by which we can see the past 
not as a necessity but as a possibility, a point emerging from contested 
perspectives. Irony is the wheel upon which the various spokes of differentiated 
repetition turn. And as such, irony can be employed in the service of a de-
colonial process, especially when the past has been coopted by a colonial power, 
and the future of an interrupted culture depends on a recognition of a lived 
practice denigrated by the superimposition of European modernity as an 
interpretative yardstick. 
 It follows that from my own perspective, that the tyranny of irony over 
philosophy installs a regime of epistemological modesty, which acts as a gesture 
to the other, an invitation to existentially engage, to speak, to fill in the space of 
irony’s negativity. In other words, irony enables us to avoid mistaking the voice of 
the other for Echo as we open up the history of the self and of the other 
dynamically through an acknowledgement of the limits of our knowledge. It is 
also important to remember that there is a danger to all this, as Kierkegaard tells 
us, we should regard irony as we would a seducer.3 
 Perhaps these thoughts are not unique in themselves. However, the crux 
of this essay boils down to this: for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Socrates 
represents a moment of crisis, a turning point in Classical Greek culture. They 
understand the Socratic moment to be one of destruction and inauguration both, 
the end of one way of thinking and the onset of another. They both believed that 
the Socratic moment was one in which the notion of the good emerges in all too 
abstract a fashion, that as conceived, it resided too far from human experience. 
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Perhaps most importantly, they understood their own moment in history to also 
be a moment of crisis and saw the reduction of the multiplicity of Socrateases to 
a singularity to be emblematic of this crisis.4  
 That said, it is important to note that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both were 
under the sway of a 19th century German fascination with Greek culture as a 
seminal moment, they lived in an intellectual climate that contributed to the 
enshrinement of the notion that classical Greece inaugurated a way of thinking 
that was integral to the world in which they lived. Many 19th century Europeans 
intellectuals understood the classical legacy to be a uniquely constituent aspect 
of their own progress and particularities. In the tradition of thought that 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche engaged with, Greece was designated as the seed 
that grew into modernity, and modernity in this tradition is Christian Europe. 
Consequently when Kierkegaard and Nietzsche came to regard their own 
historical moment as a time of crisis, as a nihilistic age where the human being 
as such was overly abstracted, they turned to Socrates in order to understand 
the trajectory of the movement towards nihilism, and as they considered him to 
be someone who helped usher in this break in western history, they believed 
understanding him was part of the solution.  
 However, when they faced Socrates, they trained their eyes on a 
multiplicity, an indiscernible negativity, a silent figure whose thought was 
available only as conveyed by others. So they addressed Socrates in Socratic 
fashion, ironically, for that was the only way to engage with an origin that was 
irretrievable, a moment whose contested legacy seemed to reveal the form of a 
crisis they felt they were re-experiencing in their own times. In other words, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche conducted their critique of modernity from the 
standpoint of modernity, by ironically engaging with the ancients, by reanimating 
the idea of history, consequently showing the fair hair of progress to have dark 
roots. If this premise is acceptable, this exploration is more than an intellectual 
historical fancy; something rather telling emerges. For within this Kierkegaardian 
and Nietzschean interrogation of European modernity, the primacy of a thinking 
that claims a progression from a central origin, from Classical Civilization and 
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thought, is a scaffolding, that is both erected and dismantled by an engagement 
with irony.  
 In other words, I believe that irony affords us a means of resistance to 
dominant discourses that level the multiplicity of perspectives in order to claim a 
progression from a clear point of origination. The crux of my concern resides in 
my belief in the value of looking at Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s critique of 
modernity from the perspective of modernity in a broader fashion. I believe their 
use of irony produces a form, a modality of thought that helps us to think about 
an ethics in a globalized, transnational world. Kierkegaard’s placement of irony 
on the border between the aesthetic and the ethical allows us to see how the 
temporal discontinuity, which he claims is the hallmark of the aesthetic, allows for 
a conception of multiple modernities to emerge and collide with dominant notions 
of historical progression.5 His understanding of the renewal of the task of 
recognizing absolute otherness for each generation, alerts us to the corporeal 
reality that each moment in the life of the human being is constituted by an ironic 
relationship to the past, one in which the contours of what will be bump up 
against an origination that returns and is changed through returning, a past in the 
state of becoming. This allows the particularity of the body in time and in space to 
take precedence as it negotiates between the multiplicity of narratives that 
converge in conscious reflection, with praxis.  
 Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrence enjoys a family relationship to this 
notion of Kierkegaardian repetition.6 In addition, Nietzsche alerts us to how 
dominant interpretations are an affect of power, how they can enervate bodies, 
and how the body and misinterpretations of the body are expressions that can 
ironically resist these the claims of these dominant interpretations, rendering 
them retrospective fictions, points of internal negotiation. This becomes even 
more interesting when a philosopher like Nietzsche, who is famous for claiming in 
a book that moves towards tracing a genealogy of morality that naming is the 
lordly right of taking possession, is read with thinkers such as the Kenyan author 
Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, who reminds us that naming a Kenyan lake after Queen 
Victoria plants European memory on African soil.7 Irony is the way to break up 
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any notion of origination that would be associated with the contingency of power 
and naming, and as such allows the multiplicity of human historical perspectives 
to begin again, to emerge again. Irony when seen from a distance considers the 
importance of namer and named both, irony sees naming as a performative act. 
 My overall premise is that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can help us think 
these thoughts through; as both thinkers were concerned with the presence of 
radical otherness,8 with a multiplicity that conveys the thought that a clear 
origination, an essential comportment is impossible. This is a frame through 
which an ethics whose normativity bathes in nihilistic institutions and relations of 
dominance can be critiqued. Furthermore, the critique of a thinking that claims 
modernity as a singular trajectory comes into play. I believe that is why Socratic 
irony became interesting for both of these thinkers for they understood that the 
multiplicity of perspectives that emerged after his death informs us about the 
centrality of interpretation in the conception of a culture. In other words, the death 
of Socrates, a primal scene in the history of Western thought becomes a moment 
where perspectives emerge and compete for primacy, where the present 
becomes a moment that contests the past, for the sake of posterity. Lastly, as 
stated, my reading of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is informed by a larger project, 
a work that addresses the effects of globalization as a leveling process, a 
process that began during the colonial era with colonial education, and whose 
effects are compounded by the way that market’s intrusion into the world of ideas 
and people obscures the needs of particular bodies in particular spaces, and 
obstructs our vision of the other through the predominance of object relations, 
reified relations. With the stakes explained (I hope), I begin.  
 
Part One: The Faintest Trace of Subjectivity (Irony is the trope of 
becoming) 
 
Perhaps we only need a trace, the faintest trace of subjectivity to sense the 
possibility of an ethics. Perhaps we have been too hasty, often mistaking this 
trace for nothing more than an echo, a narcissistic danger that confronts us at the 
moment when we sense the possibility of otherness. Perhaps the origin of the 
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voice of the other, this voice that sometimes seems to repeat what we have 
always already heard said, what we have said ourselves, is not Echo and only 
resembles her because the contours of her body cannot be discerned, and 
thereby theory renders her unseen corpus indiscernible. Perhaps this limit of 
theory, of vision, is the sole reason that voice, the trace of the other, seems so 
familiar. Perhaps this is why Socrates still attracts, and seduces, for while we 
might think he tells us something that we have heard before, he has in reality 
never told us anything. Others wearing his mask have only told us about him, 
created his reputation from their own interpretations. However, it is important to 
remember that Plato’s Socrates reminds us, even as he tells his accusers:  
I have gained this reputation, gentleman, from nothing more or less 
than a kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom do I mean? Human 
wisdom, I suppose. It seems that I am really wise in this limited 
sense. (Plato. Apology, 20d)9 
Perhaps like Plato’s Socrates, we can learn that we do not know what 
counts for wisdom in an absolute sense, that our wisdom traces a boundary, 
points to a pathway, and in no way provides us with a map. And perhaps like 
Kierkegaard and like Nietzsche, we can learn that there is no absolute origination 
for an ethics, just a borderline, a moment when the dimension of our body 
unfolds in the possibility of sensing, of discerning the desire of the other, of 
hearing the story of the other, of honoring the presence of the otherness beyond 
our ken. Perhaps then we can establish a perspective dialogically, 
acknowledging that moment where what we know recedes, leaving just the 
faintest trace for the other to sense. It can perhaps be said, that this is the 
moment when in our blindness we run our fingers across the contours of the face 
of the other, (across another’s face).  
 This describes the possibility of an ironic ethics conceived as a beginning 
without origin, always open to the new, always unknowing of the other, always 
knowing that one does not know, that one is wise “in this limited sense.” Perhaps 
our particularity cannot be described by bourgeois notions of the individual, of the 
subject. Perhaps our bodies voiced and extended in poiesis, and our selves 
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returning in praxis create the movement describing the nodal point for an ethics, 
the faintest trace of subjectivity. 
 
The Concept of Irony: Socrates as that faint trace, Socrates as an 
epistemological limit  
 
If one looks past his juvenilia, omitting his review of HC Andersen’s novels, it can 
be claimed that Kierkegaard frames his authorship around a parenthesis 
bracketing two figures, Socrates and Christ. I will amplify the significance of this 
pairing in a moment after first briefly addressing the place the Socrates enjoys in 
Kierkegaard’s authorship. If one wishes to be playful, and parody Nietzsche, the 
great parodist himself, one can take recourse to Aphorism 190 from Beyond 
Good and Evil, where after accusing Socrates of unduly influencing his most 
famous student, Nietzsche mentions that Plato through the power of his own 
interpretation had varied the image of his master “to the point of infinity and 
impossibility, into all his masks and multitudes.” The aphorism concludes with a 
phrase written in Greek that when translated reads: “if one regards Socrates, one 
sees Plato in the front, Plato in the back, and a chimera in the middle” (Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil: 80). Perhaps if one wishes to understand Kierkegaard’s 
relationship to Socrates, one must parody the parodist and claim that one sees 
Kierkegaard in front, Kierkegaard in the back and a chimera in the middle. That 
chimera is like all such fictional creatures, a hybrid, a whole consisting of 
differences, an interpretation of infinity and impossibility that assumes masks and 
multitudes; in other words a figure of possibility residing in the multiplicity 
generated by the limits of knowledge. Perhaps this would be a productive way to 
frame what Kierkegaard called his aesthetic authorship, through an 
understanding of how his engagement with Socratic irony as an epistemological 
limit, engenders the masks and multiplicity of his pseudonymous writings.10 
Perhaps one can make the case that Christ should be attached to the upbuilding 
discourses in a similar fashion, but this is both beyond my ken and the scope of 
this inquiry.  
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In any case, and as most of you already know, Kierkegaard wrote a 
dissertation entitled the Concept of Irony, and this text’s subtitle tells us that the 
concept was delineated with continual reference to Socrates. He emerges out of 
what he called “the long parenthesis” of his student years after a consideration of 
Socratic irony. The dissertation itself begins with a series of fifteen theses written 
in Latin, the first of which addresses Socrates and Christ. I will return to the 
significance of this thesis in a moment. Suffice to say for now that Kierkegaard 
opened the parenthesis of his academic thralldom by unleashing the chimera, 
Socrates, from between a prison with half circular walls. However, he closes the 
circle once again as he concludes. For at the tail end of his philosophical activity, 
in an article written during a time, which conveyed the intimations of his own 
mortality in a way that he could scarcely ignore, Kierkegaard wrote an article for 
his broadsheet, The Moment, entitled “My Task,” where he obliquely returned to 
the beginning of his enterprise, by speaking to the continuity of his thought. He 
wrote that “the only analogy I have before me is Socrates, my task is a Socratic 
task, to audit the definition of what it is to be Christian (keeping the ideal free), 
but I can make it manifest that others are that even less” (Kierkegaard: The 
Moment and Late Writings: “My Task” 341). These two texts, The Concept of 
Irony and “My Task” act in a sense as yet another pair of parentheses around 
Kierkegaard’s thought, and allow a glimpse of why one would forward the 
postulation that Kierkegaard crowns irony tyrant over philosophy.    
 For Kierkegaard, if Socrates embodied that limited kind of human wisdom; 
he was also the embodiment of irony, who left only that faintest, most ephemeral 
trace, and as such conveyed “the lightest and weakest indication of subjectivity”11 
(Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: 6). For Kierkegaard Socrates taught only 
through the negative, from the possibilities that irony affords. Remembering that 
Kierkegaard famously described Socrates’ dialog with Protagoras in the following 
manner: “They stand face to face like two bald men, who, after a long drawn out 
quarrel, finally found a comb,” (CI: 55) perhaps it is within bounds to claim that 
this constitutes Kierkegaard’s understanding of the gesture that his own texts 
needed to make; that of one bald man arguing over a comb with an invisible 
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interlocutor, a gesture of indirect communication through an ironic figuration that 
anticipates a reader to come, a reader who like the bald man seeking the comb 
must realize the difference between an ideality and existence. This is the key 
element or perhaps a result of his fascination with the figure of Socrates, as a 
human teacher12 and as a nexus of possibilities emerging from a series of 
questions. For that is what the Socratic ironist does, he turns and faces his 
moment with a question. 
As a result Kierkegaard’s reading of Socrates defied any sense of 
certainty, any sense of an answer. He could not place him, could not allow him to 
rest in one place. He refused the Socrates of Plato, the Socrates, who according 
to his adoring student, confronted Parmenides and Zeno’s notion of stasis and 
unity by positing the ideal form as a solution to the problem of multiplicity and 
change, thereby creating an abstraction, an empty resting place for the 
movement of eros. This is a Socrates that Kierkegaard considered to be 
obscured by what he called “tragic ideality.” Instead, Kierkegaard drew a 
Socrates standing on two borders: when depicted as the epitome of irony, he 
stands on the boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical, which is really the 
liminal position between the sensations of one body and the relation of many 
bodies, embodying the seductive reflection that draws one away from oneself; 
and when depicted as the epitome of the comic, Socrates, in all his 
contradictions, can be found standing on the border between the ethical and the 
religious, which is the boundary between the relationship of many bodies as they 
appear to be continuous in time and space, and the relationship between the 
particularity of one body as it attempts to form a relationship with that which is 
absolutely other, incommensurate to human experience, and outside of time and 
finitude.  
 
Part 2: Perhaps it is only the faintest trace that elicits a sense of the past as 
possibility, and anticipates a future where particularities can emerge. 
 
If the parenthetical pairing of Christ and Socrates articulates the frame of the 
perspective that Kierkegaard conveys, if he understands his task as being 
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Socratic and not Christian, the opposition he creates is not a matter of one figure 
being exclusive of the other, it is a matter of collision. To see this one only has to 
return to the first thesis of The Concept of Irony, which reads: “The similarity 
between Christ and Socrates consists essentially in their dissimilarity” (CI: 6). 
Here Christ as incarnation, as the weakening of divinity through the assumption 
of human form (Kenosis) is said to be both like and unlike Socrates, of whom we 
later learn emptied the human form through his abstraction, by means of his 
irony.13 The opposition creates a picture of what Kierkegaard construes as the 
antinomy of consciousness; Christ, whose presence on the earth embodies the 
weakening of divinity, and Socrates, who through irony, weakens the divine 
through the limits of his human knowledge, giving us only the colorless, odorless, 
faceless, forms, the abstraction of the idea in the face of absolute otherness 
together stand in for the relationship between the eternal and the temporal. With 
this pairing we have an illustration of the movement to and fro of consciousness, 
the subjectivity of the trace.14 On one hand, with Christ, you have the movement 
from the absolute to the embodied particular, from eternity to the temporal; while 
with Socrates you have the opposite movement, from the particularity of 
embodiment to the abstraction of the absolute, from the temporal to the 
imagining of the eternally enduring. Christ and Socrates are similar and dissimilar 
in that they delineate different moments in the arc of a movement, from the 
eternal to the temporal embodied, and from the temporal embodied to the eternal 
abstractly, from the absolute to the particular in temporal fullness, and from the 
particular to the absolute in radical contingency. Both movements elide or skirt 
over the territory of the ethical and both figures are sacrificed by their age as a 
result. The pairing of these figures suggests that their similarity is their tragedy, 
and their dissimilarity emerges when we consider the nature of their comedy, 
Christ is the sight of a paradox, a comic collision between the eternal and the 
temporal, he reconciles through his return absolutely particular at the end of time, 
bringing the low on high through a species of judgment that is unconditioned, and 
Socrates’ comedy, well that is another story that we will soon tell. But first there is 
one more point to make.  
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That possibility is multiple 
 
“The Ironist, however, has stepped out of line with his age, has turned around 
and faced it…the ironist is also the sacrifice the world demands, not as if the 
ironist always needed in the strictest sense to fall as a sacrifice, but his fervor in 
the service of world spirit consumes him” (CI: 261).  And in this manner, Christ, 
like Socrates, faced his age, and felt the sting of being untimely, of turning 
towards and being against his moment. However, there is a difference between 
the untimeliness of the two figures that Kierkegaard will later develop in 
Philosophical Fragments: Christ is for Kierkegaard, the epitome of the historical, 
emerging from possibility to actuality, the divine made flesh. However, for 
Kierkegaard, Socrates remains ahistorical remaining a possibility, an origin 
effaced, an effect of the vacuum of authority in the beginning of an epoch, always 
a possibility, always in potential a manner of philosophizing and creating values. 
Christ is unknowable because he embodies the paradox, the absurd, his comedy 
is his return, Socrates is unknowable because he never wrote a word that we 
retained and he was thereby unreadable; his comedy is that he was finite, but still 
cannot be read: “For the observer, Socrates’ life is like a magnificent pause in the 
course of history: we do not hear him at all; a profound stillness prevails—until it 
is broken by the noisy attempts of the many and the different schools of followers 
to trace there origins in the hidden and cryptic source” (CI: 191). Socrates’ 
comedy emerges in the noisy collisions engendered by his illegibility. He is the 
singularity that produces multiplicity. 
While Christ’s death and the externality of his life are described by the 
perspectives forwarded in the synoptic gospels, to know him for Kierkegaard, is 
tantamount to having faith in his historical facticity, his incarnation as the possible 
made actual. Socrates’ multiplicity is of a different nature, it is not a matter for 
faith but consists the emerging of other voices in the face of his silence. This is 
the crux of how Kierkegaard’s reading of Socrates differs from Hegel’s, who 
famously assigned the birth of self-consciousness to Socrates, whom he saw as 
an origin. For if Hegel ignored the multiplicity of sources that describe the 
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Socrateases that have been left to us as a trace, Kierkegaard engaged with three 
major figures who depicted Socrates. Of these, he found Xenophon too banal, 
and Plato too idealizing. Kierkegaard favored, as most of you know, Aristophanes’ 
Socrates, favoring the comic ideal over the tragic. He saw the initial moment of 
self-consciousness as a collision that could only be expressed comically and 
ironically, in an existential gesture delivered in the negative.  
 
Part 3. Clouds: the tyranny of irony  
Therefore, even though we lack direct evidence about Socrates, 
even though we lack an altogether reliable view of him, we do have 
in recompense all the various nuances of misunderstanding, and in 
my opinion that is our best asset with a personality such as 
Socrates. (CI: 128) 
As mentioned, Socrates’ comedy is that he is the singularity that produces 
multiplicity—he is a site of interpretative collision. Kierkegaard takes his solace in 
the various nuances of misunderstanding, his explication of irony performs 
ironically, and so it is not surprising that of all the misapprehensions of Socrates, 
Kierkegaard thought that Aristophanes misunderstood him in the best way 
possible. So if Socrates is misunderstood in a great variety of ways, and comedy 
for Kierkegaard involves contradictions colliding, then perhaps the best way to 
understand Kierkegaard’s Socrates is to engage with the depiction that allows us 
the most sustained and controlled comic irony. Clouds fills that bill.  
 For those of you who are unfamiliar with the play, I will quickly relate the 
story, then point out what Kierkegaard finds significant, and conclude this section 
by speaking to his points. The play opens up with Strepsiades, the twisting one, 
and his son, Phiddipedes, arising from a night’s sleep. Strepsiades is a “simple 
farmer” from a demos outside the city walls who married a woman from a more 
urbane and established family. Their son, influenced by his mother’s family,15 is a 
lover of horses, and his passion for them has landed his father into great debt. 
Strepsiades tries to convince Phiddipedes to study under Socrates, who is 
depicted running a school called the “Thinkery.” Strepsiades wants his son to 
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learn “the worse” as opposed to the “best argument” so that he can talk his way 
out of his debts. Socrates, offers instruction in both methods. Phiddipedes cannot 
be bothered and refuses to attend, so Strepsiades goes in his stead. He gains 
entry and when he meets Socrates, the latter is suspended in the air in a basket, 
a position, which he assumes for the sake of making "accurate discoveries about 
meteorological phenomena. I had to suspend my mind to comingle my rarefied 
thought with its kindred air” (Aristophanes, Clouds: 39). Socrates then proceeds 
to teach Strepsiades the inanities of his rarefied thought, and in great pedantic 
detail. The simple man is a bit too slow on the uptake and Socrates’ patience 
begins to wear as thin as the rarified air that he breathes. However, more 
importantly, Socrates introduces Strepsiades to some new deities, the clouds. He 
denies the existence of Zeus and calls the clouds “the only true goddesses,” 
while exclaiming that “all the rest are rubbish” (Clouds: 59). He adds a demand 
that Strepsiades  
will believe in no god but those we believe in: this Void, and the 
Clouds, and the Tongue…(Clouds: 71) 
I am not sure if a better description of irony has ever been conceived, a dialectic 
of the absolute potential, the empty space of the void, opposed to the bodily 
materiality of the tongue (the flesh of the word), which synthesizes into shapes, 
which dissipate and change depending on atmospheric conditions.   
 However, despite his newfound understanding of the cosmos, Strepsiades 
proves too simple to learn and he returns home, only to convince a still reluctant 
Phiddipedes to attend to matters at the “thinkery.” Socrates turns the boy over to 
the better and worse argument so that he can learn for himself from the source. 
The two types of argument then engage in a polemic that eventually degenerates 
into an ad hominem attack on the audience. The “best” argument has all the 
virtues of tradition and the “worse,” well, all the faults of ungrounded innovation. 
The “best” argument argues on the grounds of these virtues and the “worse” 
turns every argument into a play on bodily functions. Eventually the worse 
argument prevails when it points out the rather large posteriors that pervade the 
audience and the best argument leaves the field. Socrates then passes off the 
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teaching of Phiddipedes to the worse argument and the boy enters the ‘thinkery.” 
After a few days, Phiddipedes emerges from the “thinkery,’ paler than a sheet 
and armed to the teeth with worse arguments. He teaches his father a thing or 
two and Strepsiades, now equipped with weapons of mass deception, uses the 
techniques learned by his son to chase away his debtors with a fusillade of non 
sequitor. However, all does not end well. Phiddipedes, no longer believing in 
anything at all save for the power of the “worse argument,” beats his father, 
convinces him that the beating is justified, and even threatens to beat his mother. 
His embrace of the “worse argument” allows him to invert the family structure. In 
reaction, Strepsiades blames the clouds for having led him astray and their 
leader responds: “No, you’ve only yourself to blame, since you took the twisted 
path that leads to evil doing” (Clouds: 203). When Strepsiades wants to know 
why they led him on, the chorus leader replies: “ We do the same thing every 
time to anyone we catch lusting for shady dealings: we plunge him into calamity 
until he learns respect for the gods” (Clouds: 205). Strepsiades then reaffirms his 
loyalty to Zeus, climbs onto the roof of Socrates’ “Thinkery” and burns it to the 
ground. 
 I will not take you through a history of the reception of the play. Suffice it to 
say that Plato’s Socrates famously and obliquely remarks upon it during his 
apology, and Plato was reputed to sleep with a copy of Aristophanes under his 
pillow. Many commentators speak to it as a defense of tradition in the face of 
innovation, though it becomes apparent to me that the clouds shift depending on 
the moment and Strepsiades’ conversion back to traditional beliefs seem to be 
yet another twisting expediency by someone who is wont to perform such 
contortions. 
Kierkegaard’s reception of the play is significant for our purposes.  
As I mentioned previously, Kierkegaard rejects Xenophon’s representation of 
Socrates as being too banal, too close to the earth, and Plato’s because it is too 
ideal in a tragic sense, too abstracted in contemplation of the divine. Interestingly 
enough, he treats these two later depictions of Socrates before he discusses 
Aristophanes’ contemporaneous portrait suggesting that he is more interested in 
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a dialectical understanding than a historical reconstruction. Perhaps we can even 
posit a dialectic, where the thesis of Xenophon’s tongue has it antithesis in 
Plato’s void, and the synthesis of the two is the Socrates of the cloud, a Socrates 
who hovers between that which is quotidian and that which is pure abstract 
possibility in the form of the ideal, reflecting the folly of both positions through his 
pedantic negativity. More importantly, however, Aristophanes’ Socrates, like the 
clouds, reflects the desires of those who behold him. 
 In any case, Kierkegaard’s comments on the play are quite interesting. He 
sees parody as the comic ideal, and here that makes great sense as he reads 
Aristophanes’ play as a site where the manifold descriptions of a Socrates whose 
voice is effaced by history are read against other variations. Furthermore 
Kierkegaard claims that “the essence of comedy” is “viewing actuality ideally, in 
bringing the actual personality on stage” (CI: 129), and while this is certainly 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s criticism of a Euripides who he claims stands in for 
Socrates, aiding and abetting his master’s destruction of tragic culture, 
Kierkegaard is concerned with something different here, namely a dialectic of 
ironic possibility. He finds his ideal metaphor in Socrates’ new deities, the clouds, 
which Kierkegaard describes as the “aeroform reflection of his hollow interior” (CI 
133), and the “infinite possibility of becoming anything that is supposed to be yet 
unable to make anything remain established” (CI: 134). This depiction is an 
indication of how Kierkegaard viewed the parallel aspects of the crisis of 
Socrates’ moment and his own. He writes about the clouds: ”But just as their 
emptiness is manifested in themselves, so it is manifested in the community, the 
state which they nourish and protect…” (CI: 134).  
 In other words, the comic ideal of the clouds is nihilistic, as they reflect the 
emptiness of the institutions in their midst, and reflect what Kierkegaard calls the 
“impotence of the observer who sees them only in the shape of his own desires, 
who in wanting the objective obtains only his own likeness.” According to 
Kierkegaard, the tyranny of the clouds and the tyranny under which the clouds 
suffer manifests in that they “merely catch the likeness of the subject but only 
reproduce it as long as they see it” (CI: 135). This critique is almost identical to 
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Johannes, the reflective seducer’s discourse about the limitations of the mirror 
and it is easy to see here, that the irony of clouds reveals that comedy is a 
gesture, designed to prompt a repetition of the image in praxis, in thought that 
returns, to be taken up again in reflection, gjentaget, or repeated at the border 
between the self and the other. As Kierkegaard tells us, one must warn against 
irony as against a seducer. Nihilism is the danger of irony in the romantic sense 
of being infinite and absolute.  
 Kierkegaard goes on to argue that Socrates’ facetious attitude towards the 
clouds allows him to take distance from their shape changing, but “what he keeps 
is formlessless as such” (CI: 136), in other words, he is absolute becoming, pure 
possibility, but he avoids the mistake that Kierkegaard regarded the German 
romantics to have made; namely he does not enshrine irony as a principle, but 
sees it only as a form of representation. Lastly Kierkegaard equates Socrates’ 
hovering with the clouds hovering indicating his intermediary position as an 
ironist, on the border between the self and other, on the border between the 
quotidian of the ethical and the divine.  
 
Part 4: Availing oneself of the tyranny of irony to free oneself from the 
tyranny of irony 
 
If it is assumed, therefore, that Socrates’s whole activity was 
ironizing, it is also apparent that in wanting to interpret him in the 
comic vein, Aristophanes proceeded quite correctly, for as soon as 
irony is related to a conclusion, it manifests itself as comic, even 
though in another sense, it frees the individual from the comic. (CI: 
145) 
You might ask after reading this, how can irony conclude and thereby both 
establish the comic and free from the comic. How can it move in and out of the 
realm of collision, of the borderlands between beings in social relationships and 
absolute otherness? I would posit that it is only by means of irony that one can 
be freed from its tyranny, its negativity, its multiplicity without ground.16 In 
response to this danger, and with a move similar to Nietzsche’s understanding of 
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active nihilism, Kierkegaard establishes the principle of controlled irony as his 
dissertation concludes. He begins this section by addressing irony as a form of 
poetics. He rejects the excesses of romantic irony for the same reason as Hegel, 
positing that its infinite striving leads to an abyss of absolute and infinite 
negativity. He argues that Shakespeare, however, was able to master his irony, 
in order to relate himself ironically to what he writes, thereby he was able “to let 
the objective dominate” (CI: 324). This is the very reason that Aristophanes was 
able to depict a Socrates that was true to his appearance, multiple and 
indiscernible for his contemporaries, hovering somewhere in between the 
heavens and the earth. This type of totalized irony in the poetic act makes “the 
poet and the poem free.” According to Kierkegaard this occurs because 
controlled irony does not infinitely regress, but instead is made finite, sitting on 
the boundary of the poetic and the actual, on the border of the projection of the 
self through making, and this making being in turn, the extension of the self in the 
anticipation of interaction with others.  
To be controlled in this way, to be halted in the wild infinity into 
which it rushes ravenously, by no means indicates that irony should 
lose its meaning or be totally discarded. On the contrary, when the 
individual is properly situated—and this he is through the 
curtailment of irony—only then does irony have its proper meaning, 
its true validity. In our age, there has been much talk about the 
importance of doubt for science and scholarship, but what doubt is 
for science, irony is for personal life. …As soon as irony is 
controlled, it makes a movement opposite to that in which 
uncontrolled irony declares its life. Irony, limits, finitizes, and 
circumscribes and thereby yields truth, actuality, content; it 
disciplines and punishes and thereby yields balance and 
consistency. Irony is a disciplinarian feared only by those who do 
not know it, but loved by those who do. (CI: 326) 
Here we can discern the movement that allows the tyranny of irony to free 
us from irony. The act of mastered ironic poiesis allows the poet to move outside 
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the poem, to produce an objectivity that bears the trace of her mastery. However, 
there is a double movement to controlled irony, as the employment of irony 
allows a praxis, the first trace of a personal life to emerge in actuality, in an 
actuality, which “acquires its validity through action” (CI:329). This action, as has 
been pointed out, is a form of movement; namely, the extension of the human 
being through poiesis and the movement back to the self via the intensive activity 
of praxis, a movement to and fro, that indicates the faintest trace of subjectivity, 
the beginning of a personal life that is tied to actuality, one that listens for 
otherness, one in which as Victor Eremita reminds us, the inner is not the outer, 
and hearing is the sense most necessary.17 “The ironist,” Kierkegaard tells us “is 
a prophesy about or an abbreviation of a complete personality” (CI: 149). And I 
would claim that a complete personality, the trace is ironically opened up towards 
the possibility of otherness through anticipation.  
 
Part 5: A Nietzschean coda: We knowers do not know ourselves:  
irony as ethos 
 
I must confess that Socrates is so close to me that I am almost 
always fighting a battle with him. (Notebook 6(3) 1875) 
Thus wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in the early summer of 1875, and we can see 
from this remark, that Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard understood Socrates to be a 
point of reference that could not be avoided. He considered the Socratic moment 
to announce the onset of nihilism and if his published criticism of Socrates’ 
thoughts, influence, and appearance will span his entire career, his unpublished 
work is much more ambivalent. But these are thoughts for another essay.  
In any case, Nietzsche was very much aware of the multiplicity of Socratic 
sources, though unlike Kierkegaard, he favored Xenophon’s account, calling his 
Memorabilia, the most valuable book in antiquity, one that “wounds and gives 
pleasure” (Notebook 18 (47) 1876). Though he never explicitly refers to this, and 
as I mention in the introduction to this essay, I can imagine a young Nietzsche 
reading Xenophon’s version of the Symposium (Banquet), reaching the end and 
beholding the scene with Socrates: that of two young actors playing the part of 
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Dionysus and Ariadne on Naxos. Xenophon describes how neither Socrates nor 
his companions can discern whether they are acting or not, and I can only 
imagine Nietzsche being drawn to the blurring of the line between self and other, 
between masks, the erasure of the border between role played and affect 
experienced, and knowing that Xenophon’s version of Socrates understood the 
Dionysian.  
However, the issue is the relationship of Socrates to the ironic and the 
ironic to the ethical, and while the Dionysian draws and intoxicates, it is 
Nietzsche’s Socrates who often stands in opposition to this god who returns. 
That is the exoteric expression of Nietzsche’s position. What I would like to 
suggest as I close, is that this position is the mask for Nietzsche’s movement 
towards the tyranny of Socratic irony, and his subsequent movement away from 
it by virtue of an irony that resembles Kierkegaardian irony, an irony that makes 
an existential gesture to the dear reader, or in Nietzsche’s case, to all and no one. 
This is how the Nietzschean critique of morality approaches an ethics, its 
possibility is construed at the limit of intersubjectivity—where the other is 
anticipated but not yet present. 
 “We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers,” (Nietzsche: On a Genealogy 
of Morals: 3) the German illustrates the point even better, “Wir sind uns 
unbekannt, wir Erkenenden, wir selbst, uns selbst…” (KSA 5:247) the play of the 
subject and object pronoun, the sentence brilliantly separating each; first by the 
verb to be, and then by the self. And so Nietzsche opens his movement towards 
a genealogy of morals, by pluralizing the emblematic, ironic, Socratic dictum: I 
know that I do not know. For in matters of morality, the faintest trace of the plural, 
emerges only by virtue of an ironic understanding that the particularity of an 
embodied body politic cannot be known unless we view it as a possibility whose 
representation has heretofore been governed by power relations, we cannot 
know it in and of itself through the way it represents itself. Subsequently, 
Nietzsche seems to be saying as he opens his genealogy: any attempt at 
understanding the origin of an inclusive ethos, the relationship between a we and 
an us, needs to be governed by Socratic ignorance, a questioning without 
Konturen VII (2015) 188	  
expectation of an answer that might reveal more than a limited wisdom. For if 
Nietzsche’s genealogies can be boiled down to a process, this process receives 
a concise expression in aphorism # 34 in the Gay Science, Historia Abscondita,18 
where we are told that perhaps the past is still to be discovered, and this 
discovery is contingent upon the temporal irony that the past too is in a state of 
becoming, for the repetition of history in the consciousness of the individual is 
governed by an ironic relationship to the past, one where its representation is 
often a misrecognition of the fact of the body. Perhaps like the “I,” the “we” is also 
a prejudice of grammar.  
 
Repetition: Opening up to otherness; Incipit Nietzsche 
 
The best expression of this temporal irony, an irony when the past is anticipated, 
is Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return of the same. Nietzsche’s first public 
announcement of the eternal return comes in aphorism 340, the penultimate 
section in the 1881 edition of the Gay Science. In this aphorism, which begins, 
with the word “Wie” and ends with the choice between two alternatives, the 
reader is asked how she would respond when asked to experience her entire life 
again. In this aphorism, perhaps the central moment in Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
posited in the form of a question, and this question is placed in a sense in 
parenthesis, enclosed between 2 other aphorisms: Namely, #339, The dying 
Socrates, which describes the last moments before the death of Socrates and # 
341 Zarathustra’s Untergang. In 339, Nietzsche criticizes Plato’s Socrates for 
sacrificing a cock to Asclepius, thanking him for curing of the disease of life, and 
in # 341, entitled, Incipit Tragoedia, we have almost the exact text which opens 
up Nietzsche’s next book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
 The dying Socrates’ exoteric meaning is conveyed by Nietzsche’s criticism 
of what he calls Socrates’ resentment, and his statement that we need to 
overcome even the Greeks. However, a more esoteric reading emerges when we 
remember that this is Plato’s Socrates, and that he had given his reasons for not 
fleeing in the Crito, stating that “If it is what the Gods want so be it” (Plato, The 
Crito: 43b), that his priority was not merely to live, “but to live well,” (Crito: 48b) 
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and that he had refused to escape because he did not want to defy his fate. 
Plato’s Socrates had also expressed that “to be afraid of death is only another 
form of thinking that one is wise” (Plato: The Apology 29a) and he expressed that 
he had hoped to continue to seek wisdom in the world beyond (The Phaedo), an 
anticipation he felt comfortable expressing because who knew the ways of the 
gods and what happens beyond the border of life. In other words, Socrates kept 
true to his limited wisdom, and he accepted his fate, and when he drinks from his 
cup of poison, he enters into the realm of pure possibility by affirming it, Amor 
Fati. And this is precisely, what Zarathustra, the teacher of the return will be 
confronted with in Nietzsche’s next book, the affirmation of the return of his 
experience, including that which disgusted him.  
The other side of this parenthesis drawn around the announcement of the 
eternal return, the aphorism that announces Zarathustra’s Untergang, that 
announces, Incipit Trageodia, finds a Zarathustra, “sick of his wisdom,” who must 
go down to human beings and “give away and distribute until the wise among the 
humans enjoy their folly and the poor once again their riches.” (Nietzsche,The 
Gay Science: 195) He ends by telling the sun that his wisdom’s “cup wants to 
become empty again,” (cup of poison, cup of honey) and Zarathustra, the teacher 
of the eternal return, anticipates going down to the world of the human body 
politic to invert relations and empty himself. It is also important to remember both 
that The Gay Science opens with an aphorism that asks when the time for 
laughter, for comedy will come, and that in the 1886 preface to the second 
edition of the text, Nietzsche tells us that perhaps he should have written Incipit 
Parodia to crown aphorism 341.  
What does this mean? Nietzsche announces the eternal return as a 
question, and encloses it between an ironic condemnation of a Plato’s ideally 
tragic Socrates and Zarathustra’s Untergang. Socrates accepts, affirms his fate, 
the fate of entering pure possibility, the return itself is posited as a possibility, and 
Zarathustra’s tragedy emerges in parody as it develops. In my opinion, this 
alludes, to Socrates’ question at the end of Plato’s Symposium, where he 
wonders if the union of comedy and tragedy was a possibility, a union in that 
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case embodied by Aristophanes, who depicted eros as that phenomenon that 
leads us to reclaim the lost half of our bodies, and Agathon, who bestows ethical 
virtues and youth upon eros. Perhaps this moment, where the longing for other 
bodies as a species of completion and the abstraction from those bodies as 
virtue meet, is the moment of parody, the moment of the comic poem besides the 
tragic poem, the overcoming of the tyranny of irony by virtue of the promise of 
repetition. We will always encounter each other again.  
 
Last words: It is a matter of voice—Sing Socrates 
 
I will end where Nietzsche began, with The Birth of Tragedy where in section 14, 
Nietzsche cites Plato’s Phaedo. Speaking to a dream dreamt by Socrates on the 
eve of his death, we are reminded that he is told to make music, to write poetry in 
other words. Nietzsche then suggests that perhaps we need a musical 
Socrates.19 In a sense, Socrates’ silence is ironized and his understanding that 
his finitude calls for him to extend himself through poiesis becomes an unspoken 
supplement to the emptiness left behind by his silence. And it is with this 
suggestion that I will conclude, for perhaps the best way to ward off the 
possibility of mistaking the voice of the other for an echo, is to realize that 
wisdom sings when it meets the outer borders of its awareness, that perhaps we 
need to pay heed to aesthetics again, listening for the voice of the other silenced 
up to now, by our conception of an unchanging past.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony 261. “The ironist, however, has stepped out 
of line with his age, has turned around and faced it…the ironist is also the 
sacrifice the world demands, not as if the ironist always needed in the strictest 
sense to fall as a sacrifice, but his fervor in the service of the world spirit 
consumes him.” 
 
2 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 39, 39. 
 
3 See Kierkegaard. Concept of Irony 329. 
 
4 Michael Silk introduces the phrases Socrateases in his article, “Nietzsche’s 
Socrateases” collected in Socrates in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
edited by Michael Trapp. 
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5 Please note that I am not necessarily reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche with 
their intentions, but rather in the interstices of their processes, their engagements 
and descriptions of the situation of their writing. 
 
6 See Niels Nymann Eriksson. Kierkeggard’s Concept of Repetition, especially 
pages 136-164. 
 
7 See Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, “Europhone or African Memory: the challenge of the 
pan-Africanist intellectual in the era of globalization” collected in African 
Intellectuals edited by Thandika Mkandawire,155-164, or see Ngugi Wa Thiong’o 
Decolonizing the Mind. 
 
8 What Kangas calls the ab-solute in his excellent monograph on Kierkegaard, 
Kierkegaard’s Instant. 
 
9 This citation can be found in Plato. The Last Days of Socrates, 41. 
 
10 When one thinks about Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect communication in 
dialog with his writings on irony, it becomes easy to see how his dissertation 
anticipated the masking of the pseudonymous writings. On pgs. 48-49 in The 
Concept of Irony he writes: “But precisely because it is the nature of irony never 
to unmask itself and also because a Protean change of masks is just as essential, 
the infatuated youth must inevitably experience so much torment. But just as 
there is something deterring about irony, it likewise has something extraordinarily 
seductive and fascinating. Its masquerading and mysteriousness, the telepathic 
communication it prompts because an ironist always has to be understood at a 
distance, the infinite sympathy it proposes, the fleeting but indescribable instant 
of understanding that is immediately superseded by the anxiety of 
misunderstanding—all this holds love prisoner in inextricable bonds.”  And on pg. 
251 of the same text: “In all these cases, irony manifests itself rather as the irony 
that comprehends the world, seeks to mystify the surrounding world, seeking not 
so much to remain in hiding itself as to get others to disclose themselves.” (251) 
And on pg. 53 in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, he writes: “One 
can deceive a person out of what is true, and—to recall old Socrates—one can 
deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only this way can a deluded person 
actually be brought into what is true—by deceiving him.” In short, the 
Kierkegaardian text employs irony to deceive the reader into self-disclosure. Like 
Xenophon’s actors, the ironist wears a mask and deceives the onlooker to enact 
a consideration of the relationship between role-playing and the self in relation to 
the divine. 
 
11 Søren Kierkegaard. Thesis VIII, Concept of Irony. Hereafter citations for this 
text will be marked CI.   
 
Konturen VII (2015) 192	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For an explanation how Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus regards 
Socratic epistemological possibilities, see Philosophical Fragments. 
 
13 Kierkegaard’s depiction of Aristophanes’ Clouds as the best depiction of 
Socrates, and his argument that Socrates’ existence is irony informs us of the 
emptying of Socrates to which I refer. Kierkegaard describes the Clouds as a 
figure analogous to Socratic irony on pg. 134: “…in the clouds are nothing but fog 
or the dim, self-affecting infinite possibility of becoming anything that is supposed 
to be, yet unable, to make anything remain established, the possibility that has 
infinite dimensions and seems to encompass the whole world but still has no 
content, can accept anything but remains nothing.” And again on pg. 137: “The 
clouds always appear in a form, but Socrates knows that the form is the 
unessential and that the essential lies behind the form, just as the idea is the true 
and the predicate as such means nothing.” And in a footnote on pg 221 he refers 
to the reflexivity Socrates’ ironic personality as “abstract and without content.” 
And on pg. 258: “For irony, everything becomes nothing, but nothing can be 
taken in several ways.” 
 
14 For an explanation of the “to and fro of subjectivity” see Stern “Persona, 
Personae: Placing Kierkegaard in Conversation with Bergman.” For the 
Kierkegaardian source, see Repetition: A Venture in Experimental Pyschology,  
especially the opening paragraph on pg. 131 and the beginning of Part 2 on pg. 
179. 
 
15 The hybridity attached to Phiddipedes and is explained by his father 
Strepsiades on pg. 17 of Clouds. Speaking about how his son was named, he 
remarks: “After that, when this son was born to us, I mean to me and my high-
class wife, we started to bicker over his name. She was for adding hippos to the 
name. Xanthippos or Chaerippus or Callippides, while I was for calling him 
Phidonides after his grandfather. So for a while we argued, until finally we 
compromised and called him Phidippedes. “The footnotes in the Loeb Classics 
Edition of the play explain that a suffix of hippos conveys an aristocratic origin 
and that Phidonides means the thrifty one. Knowing this it becomes apparent that 
the aristocratic pretensions of Strepsiades wife are combined with his own 
meaness—excess and austerity conflate in the boy, perhaps explaining his 
propensity for debt. 
 
16 This is related to the idea of controlled irony that can be found in the last 
section of The Concept of Irony. See pages 324-329. In brief, there is a type of 
irony that allows one to take distance from one’s habits of thought. Kierkegaard 
uses several examples and analogies to convey this: aesthetically Shakespeare 
serves as an exemplar, while existentially irony is compared to a seducer leading 
towards the truth but is not the truth as such. Awareness of one’s own ironic 
comportment is key to freeing oneself of the snare of the negative infinity of 
Romantic irony. 
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17 See the first pages of the forward to Kierkegaard’s Either/Or Volume 1. 
 
18 See Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Aphorism 34, pg. 53. 
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